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Introduction

In the last twenty years a number of diverse fields have found ritual
to be an important focus for new forms of cultural analysis. Besides
anthropologists, sociologists, and historians of religion, there are
sociobiologists, philosophers, and intellectual historians who have
turned to ritual as a "window" on the cultural dynamics by which
people make and remake their worlds. The result has been a relatively broad and interdisciplinary conversation known as "ritual
studies." Certainly the notion of ritual has been central to research
in religion and society since the late nineteenth century, and few
other single terms have been more fundamental in defining the issues
basic to culture, society, and religion. Now, however, ritual has
become a topic of interest in its own right, not merely a tool for
understanding more embracing social phenomena. Indeed, ritual
has simultaneously become an object, a method, and even something of a style of scholarship on the American academic scene.
Given both the history and scope of the appeal to ritual as a
category of experience and analysis, the term is overdue for an
extended critical rethinking. Jack Goody first addressed the state
of ritual theory in a definitive study published nearly thirty years
ago. Yet when he last addressed it in 1976, he expressed a dramatic
loss of confidence in the formal category of ritual.9 Aside from his
comments, there has been no sustained analysis of the term that
evaluates its role in our thinking on religion, society, and culture.10
Nor has there been any concomitant assessment of the underlying
problems engaged by the term 'ritual' and the structure this category
imposes on theoretical discourse.
3
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This book undertakes such an analysis in two ways: first, through
a critical reading of how the notion of ritual has been used in the
study of religion, society, and culture; and second, through an attempt to carve out an approach to ritual activities that is less encumbered by assumptions about thinking and acting and more
disclosing of the strategies by which ritualized activities do what
they do. I do not provide a comprehensive history of the term, a
review of the most famous ethnographic examples, or a revised
theory of ritual—useful though these projects might be. The purpose of this book is both more ambitious and more pragmatic—
to reassess what we have been doing with the category of ritual,
why we have ended up where we are, and how we might formulate
an analytic direction better able to grasp how such activities compare to other forms of social action.
The sections that follow concentrate on a broad but selective set
of influential theories about ritual. My discussion remains focused
on an explicitly theoretical level of reflection about ritual rather
than one more linked to ethnographic data. While many theories
come embedded in particular ethnographic studies, none confine
themselves to interpreting just the rites of a particular group. They
all generalize in order to discuss ritual action per se. Since I am
concerned with the most basic assumptions and tendencies in thinking about ritual activities, the analyses that follow also remain rather
abstract. My starting point is not some objective instance of ritual
activity that I attempt to interpret, such as Vedic ritual or the garden
magic of the Trobriand Islanders. Rather, my starting point is an
exploration of what makes us identify some acts as ritual, what
such a category does for the production and organization of knowledge about other cultures, and how we might assess the assumptions
that create and constrain the notion of ritual. Truly thick ethnographic descriptions of particular rites rarely succumb to the systematic division of human experience evidenced in theoretical
studies. When they do, it is frequently due to the influence of categories developed to empower theoretical discourse. The divergence
between theoretical formulations and descriptive studies is germane
to the issues raised here, but a fuller treatment is regrettably beyond
the scope of this book.11
In addition to analyzing the category of ritual and proposing
another framework within which to assess ritual activity, this book
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has a third level of concern. In arguing how categories of ritual
practice have been used to define objects and methods of theoretical
practice, I raise questions about the dynamics of theoretical practice
as such. By dismantling ritual as a theoretical construct, it is possible
to uncover some of the more hidden but decisive practices by which
a body of theoretical knowledge is generated and theoretical activity
is differentiated from other forms of social activity. As part of its
exploration of ritual, therefore, this book initiates a foray beyond
the customary confines of ritual theory to suggest some of the strategies basic to other forms of practice and the social relationships
these practices support.
The intellectual framework for 'doing theory' has shifted dramatically in the last twenty years. The premises and boundaries of
the theoretical enterprise have undergone a wave of challenges, a
periodic but no less traumatic experience, leaving us to wonder how
and what we can know. This series of challenges has generated an
open debate on the social and political ramifications of particular
forms of knowing.11 Some consensus has emerged from this debate
that critical analysis of a theoretical perspective must look not only
to the logic of the set of ideas under scrutiny, but also to the history
of their construction.13 In addition, a critical analysis must also
incorporate a reflexive awareness of the conditions under which it
operates to constitute meaningful interpretation/4 In this era of
theoretical practice, therefore, we are "rethinking" entire conceptual constructions handed down within our fields of inquiry.15 Any
thorough process of rethinking these basic concepts appears to involve three closely related operations: first, a deconstruction of the
historical definitions of the problem or issue and a delineation of
the circumstances under which the problem has been a problem for
us; second, the proposal of an interpretive perspective on the issue
that enables our cultural categories seriously to engage and be engaged by the material addressed; and third, an extension of this
perspective to real applications and examples in order to explore
relationships among hitherto unrelated issues.16
In rethinking ritual these operations form three stages of the
argument that spans the following sections. The first stage discloses
the construction of ritual as an object of analysis and thereby reveals
the problems for us that have been embodied in the term and discourse on it. The second stage formulates an interpretation of this
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problem that reflexively provides an analysis of its own conditions
as an interpretation. And the third stage, by applying this interpretation to a field of interrelated issues, attempts to generate an
open but coherent framework for seeing new relationships among
traditional issues, without losing sight of the contingent and determined nature of this framework.
More specifically, the chapters in Part I take up the initial task
of a critical theory of ritual by addressing the construction of the
category itself and the role this construction has played in organizing
a broad discourse on religion, society, and culture. Despite the
differences among historians of religion, sociologists, and anthropologists, their theories of ritual all similarly function to resolve
the complex problems posed by an initial bifurcation of thought
and action. Indeed, theoretical discourse about ritual is organized
as a coherent whole by virtue of a logic based on the opposition
of thought and action. This argument suggests that, historically,
the whole issue of ritual arose as a discrete phenomenon to the eyes
of social observers in that period in which 'reason' and the scientific
pursuit of knowledge were defining a particular hegemony in Western intellectual life.
Given such a sociohistorical and logical-practical context for the
term "ritual" as a category of experience and of analysis, a question
arises: Can there be any argument for continuing to ascribe validity
to the term? Goody, as noted earlier, sees no further usefulness in
a "global construct" like ritual and has seriously called for its retirement in favor of a revitalizing "paradigm shift."17 Although it
is interesting to imagine a paradigm shift, any number of problems
beset the attempt to jettison an older category, whether it be to
impose a new one or simply to clear the field. There is hardly a
consensus, first of all, about the inadequacy of the term ritual. It
is still being used widely both by the general public and by many
academic disciplines less immediately concerned with the problems
that attend it. In fact, the popularity of the term and the topic,
evidenced in ritual studies, reflects the very success scholars have
had in securing the retirement of older and more obviously problematic terms. That is, ritual has replaced terms such as 'liturgy'
versus 'magic', which were used to distinguish high religion from
primitive superstition or our ritual from theirs. To try to discard
the term ritual just when scholars have been successful in popular-
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izing its use would imply a desire for esoteric categories accessible
only to the cognoscenti.
Such housecleaning could also undermine any thorough exploration of how and why the term has become problematic. It is far
from clear that a quickly summoned paradigm shift could solve
either our immediate problems or the more buried ones they rest
upon. Many attempts to produce a paradigm shift end up simply
repackaging older problems in new jargon. Rather than eventually
find that the disgraced presuppositions of the abandoned term have
resurfaced in a newly deployed set of categories, it seems more
responsible to hold on to our battered terminology, just as we hold
on to the artifacts of our own personal histories no matter how
difficult they might become. They ensure that we do not forget
where we come from. They curb our pretenses. We may decide to
tailor our terms with annotations or hyphenations, but it would be
ill-advised to pretend to abandon what has been so well internalized.
A real revolution will not be accomplished by a mere change of
terms, nor will it be held off by modifying older ones. I do intend
to modify the term ritual to function as something other than a
"global construct" or "a key to culture."18 Yet my close reliance
upon current and preceding scholarship ensures continuity with the
commonsense notion of ritual while making explicit some of the
assumptions and perspectives built into it. Given the analysis of
discourse on ritual presented in Part I, it becomes apparent that
rethinking ritual will yield less rather than more—less generality,
less universality, and perhaps less of the trappings of persuasive,
explanative power. This 'less-ness' may ultimately be more effective
in spurring a shift of paradigms than the introduction of newly
designed terms.
Part II, which takes on the second task of critical theorizing,
proposes that so-called ritual activities be removed from their isolated position as special paradigmatic acts and restored to the context of social activity in general. Some attempts to see ritual as
social praxis are analyzed, as are the stubborn difficulties encountered by 'practice theory' in its attempt to transcend only the most
obvious forms of the thought—action dichotomy. In response, I
propose a focus on 'ritualization' as a strategic way of acting and
then turn to explore how and why this way of acting differentiates
itself from other practices. When analyzed as ritualization, acting
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ritually emerges as a particular cultural strategy of differentiation
linked to particular social effects and rooted in a distinctive interplay
of a socialized body and the environment it structures. The confusions that accompany attempts to distinguish clearly between rite
and non-rite—those perennial obstacles to neat definitions and classification—are revealed to be highly significant for understanding
what ritualization does.
Part III addresses the large body of theories that discuss ritual as
a form of social control. In so doing it attempts to fulfill the third
task of a critical theory by applying an interpretation of ritualization
as a culturally strategic way of acting to several classic issues within
the traditional study of ritual, namely, belief, ideology, legitimation,
and power. The main argument suggests that ritualization is a strategy for the construction of a limited and limiting power relationship.
This is not a relationship in which one social group has absolute
control over another, but one that simultaneously involves both
consent and resistance, misunderstanding and appropriation. In exploring how ritualized ways of acting negotiate authority, self, and
society, I attempt to delineate something of the social dynamics by
which all activity reproduces and manipulates its own contextual
ground.
As a particular reading of much of what has been written on
ritual, this book is neither an objective nor a systematic review
designed to evaluate each contribution in its own context and on
its own merits. On the contrary, I have read to discover the cracks,
instabilities, and manipulated themes in order to undo the process
by which the notion of ritual has been constructed and to illuminate
dynamics basic to how we think about the actions of others. At the
risk of making the reading more difficult than it needs to be, I have
tried to quote or paraphrase terms and descriptions as much as
possible, since much of my argument rests on the subtle ways in
which language is used.
Fredric Jameson introduced a recent study by calling attention
to its "organizational fiction," the textual ploy that implies the
existence of a problem the study will resolve.19 The problem of
ritual is, of course, just such an organizational fiction. This book
is organized around a problem it first constructs and then solves—
the problem of how the notion of ritual orders a body of theoretical
discourse. I must first convince you that there is a problem and that
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the nature of it is such that you will find the proposed solution
suitable. This is a strategy of scholarly production, aspects of which
are common to other forms of socially effective action. It is my
hope that this book, by virtue of its arguments about ritual theory
as well as its own performance as a piece of theoretical practice
(with all its schemes, feints, and blind spots), will contribute to a
discussion of the activities of understanding.
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